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There’s a Whole World Out There: Justice Kennedy’s Use
of International Sources
Stephen C. McCaffrey*
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, a pivotal member of the Supreme Court, has
shown a tendency in a number of his opinions for the Court to draw upon
international sources—that is, legal materials from countries and systems outside
1
2
of the United States. This is particularly true in three cases : Lawrence v. Texas,
3
4
Roper v. Simmons, and Graham v. Florida. This Article will briefly survey
Justice Kennedy’s use of international materials in these cases and note reactions
to this practice by other members of the Court.
A. New Legal Isolationism in America?
It takes no more than a glance at the earliest volumes of U.S. Reports to
confirm that the practice of drawing upon international sources is nothing new to
the Supreme Court. Beginning with its earliest opinions in the 1790s, the Court
5
has often referred to international law and non-American materials. Chief Justice
John Jay explained in the Court’s 1793 decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, “the
United States had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth, become
amenable to the laws of nations; and it was their interest as well as their duty to

* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
1. Another opinion for the Court by Justice Kennedy, Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010), could
also be cited in this connection, but will not be discussed here because case law of other countries was used in
relation to the interpretation of a treaty, the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
Oct. 25, 1980, 102 Stat. 437, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–11, not in the
interpretation of the Constitution. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1987. The issue in Abbott produced a rather odd
constellation of votes on the Court, with Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Alito, and Sotomayor joining Justice
Kennedy in the majority, and Justice Stevens filing a dissenting opinion in which Justices Thomas and Breyer
joined. Id. But Justice Stevens’ dissent was more critical of the majority’s conclusion that the views of “sister
signatories” reflected the “broad acceptance” of the interpretation adopted by the majority claimed by Justice
Kennedy than of the use of foreign sources itself. Id. at 2008–09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
3. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
4. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
5. See David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge, International Law in the Supreme
Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 7 (D. Sloss,
M. Ramsey & W. Dodge eds., 2011).
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6

provide, that those laws should be respected and obeyed . . . .” The Court has
7
even relied on international law as the rule of decision in some cases.
What is new is the strident criticism of this practice in the first decade of the
8
9
twenty-first century, by both dissenting members of the Court and
10
11
12
commentators in academia, politics, and the media. This criticism appears to
reflect an unfortunate, isolationist, and almost xenophobic tendency—enacted
13
14
into law in Oklahoma and several other states —toward barring courts from
relying on international or foreign laws.
But Justice Kennedy, continuing the long tradition of the Supreme Court, has
not refrained from mentioning international sources, despite blistering dissents by
some of his colleagues on this point. To read these dissenting opinions, and some
of the reactions by commentators in the media, one would think that Justice
Kennedy, writing for the Court, relied entirely upon international authority as the
basis of his decisions.
We can perhaps forgive media commentators for not actually having read the
opinions in question; if they had, they would know that international authority
was referred to merely to confirm a decision at which the Court had already
arrived. The Court was not blazing a new trail, but was rather joining other
Western nations and the rest of the international community.

6. 2 U.S. 419, 474 (1793); see also, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 281 (1796).
7. See, e.g., Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (relying on a rule of customary international law).
8. See Mark Tushnet, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation in the Twenty-First Century:
Change and Continuity, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note 5, at 507–17.
9. See infra notes 23, 33–40, and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., H.R.Res. on the Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of the Constitution
of the U.S.: Hearing on H.R. Res. 97 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 109–40 (2005) (statement of
Prof. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz) (describing and endorsing a proposed constitutional amendment barring references
to the laws of other states in construing the Constitution) referred to in Tushnet, supra note 8, at n.3. The amendment
proposed by Professor Rosenkranz would read: “This Constitution was ordained and established by the People of the
United States, and so it shall not be construed by reference to the contemporary laws of other nations.” Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, An American Amendment, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 482 (2009). See generally Mark Tushnet,
When Is Knowing Less Better than Knowing More?: Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme Court
Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2006), for the critical analysis of the objections to referring to
foreign law.
11. See the examples cited by Tushnet, supra note 8, at 507 n.3.
12. See, e.g., C. Levy, Sotomayor and International Law, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2009, at A13; Editorial,
Kagan: Foreign Law Trumps Constitutional Law, WASH. TIMES, May 25, 2010, at 2; Editorial, Sharia in
America’s Courts; Koranic Law: Coming to a City Near You, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2012, at 2; and OpEditorial, Legal Eagle: Foreign Laws Don’t Apply to U.S. Cases, OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 17, 2009, at 8A.
13. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
14. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (Supp. 2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3101 to -3103
(2011); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 20-15-102 (2010); see generally Martha F. Davis & Johanna Kalb, Oklahoma and
Beyond: Understanding the Wave of State Anti-Transnational Law Initiatives, 87 IND. L.J. SUPP. 1, 3 (2011)
(citing laws, initiatives, and constitutional amendments of a number of states).
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This is evident from the following discussion of the main cases in question.
B. Justice Kennedy’s Use of International Sources
15

We can begin with Lawrence v. Texas, decided by the Court in 2003.
Lawrence, as is now well known, involved a conviction under a Texas statute
that criminalized certain intimate sexual conduct between two persons of the
16
same sex. Overruling a prior case, the Court held, in an opinion by Justice
17
Kennedy, that the Texas statute violated the Due Process Clause.
Although it does not involve international sources, I cannot resist quoting the
opening paragraph of the opinion, not only because it sets the stage, but because
it is a shining example of the eloquence and inspirational language of which
Anthony Kennedy is capable. Justice Kennedy wrote:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions
into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not
omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression,
and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the
18
person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.
By framing the case in this way, Justice Kennedy won the rhetorical battle in the
first paragraph of the opinion.
But, of course, Justice Kennedy went on to marshal evidence, both historical
and contemporary, concerning the treatment of same-sex relations in British and
U.S. law. He concluded that “the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers [the
earlier decision of the Court that Lawrence overruled] are more complex than the
majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger indicate.
Their historical premises are not without doubt and, at the very least, are
19
overstated.”
Justice Kennedy reserved particular attention for Chief Justice Burger’s
remark in his opinion in Bowers that “‘[d]ecisions of individuals relating to
homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the
history of Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted
20
in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards.’”
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Id. at 562.
Id. at 578–79.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 571.
Id. (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)).
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Justice Kennedy responded in a way that well illustrates his thinking:
The sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger to the history of
Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards
did not take account of other authorities pointing in an opposite direction.
A committee advising the British Parliament recommended in 1957
repeal of laws punishing homosexual conduct. Parliament enacted the
substance of those recommendations 10 years later.
Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was
decided the European Court of Human Rights considered a case with
parallels to Bowers and to today’s case. An adult male resident in
Northern Ireland alleged he was a practicing homosexual who desired to
engage in consensual homosexual conduct. The laws of Northern Ireland
forbade him that right. He alleged that he had been questioned, his home
had been searched, and he feared criminal prosecution. The court held
that the laws proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European
Convention on Human Rights. Authoritative in all countries that are
members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations now), the
decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward
21
was insubstantial in our Western civilization.
After demonstrating that the Supreme Court had rejected the foundations of
Bowers in other decisions, Justice Kennedy returned to the broader picture. He
observed:
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider
civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers
have been rejected elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights has
followed not Bowers but its own decision in [the case referred to earlier].
Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of
the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate,
consensual conduct. The right the petitioners seek in this case has been
accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries.
There has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest
in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or
22
urgent.
These references did not escape Justice Scalia’s attention. In his dissenting
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia
responded: “The Court’s discussion of . . . foreign views . . . is . . . meaningless
21. Id. at 572–73 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 576–77 (citations omitted).
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dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since ‘this Court . . . should not impose foreign
23
moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.’” Here, Justice Scalia was quoting from
24
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in denying certiorari in another case, evidently
unable to find any actual precedent to use as support for his views.
I can be more brief with respect to the other two cases, because the dynamics
within the Court in Lawrence set the tone for the cases to follow. In Roper v.
Simmons, a Missouri court sentenced Mr. Simmons to death for a murder he
25
committed when he was seventeen years old. Justice Kennedy authored the
Court’s opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
affirming the Missouri Supreme Court’s grant of the defendant’s petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that execution of individuals who were
under eighteen at the time of their capital crimes is prohibited by the Eighth and
26
Fourteenth Amendments.
After deciding on the basis of U.S. authority that the death penalty cannot be
imposed on juvenile offenders, Justice Kennedy devoted the entirety of Part IV
27
of his opinion to the practice in other countries. The following portions of this
analysis indicate the flavor of his thinking:
Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate
punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality
that the United States is the only country in the world that continues to
give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty. This reality does not
become controlling, for the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment
remains our responsibility. Yet at least from the time of the Court’s
decision in Trop, the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and
to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the
28
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments.”
Justice Kennedy was here referring to Trop v. Dulles, a 1958 plurality
opinion in which the Court found it necessary to take into account “the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” to determine
29
which punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual.
Justice Kennedy also noted that “Article 37 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which every country in the world has
ratified save for the United States and Somalia, contains an express prohibition

23. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari)).
24. Id.
25. 543 U.S. 551, 556 (2005).
26. Id. at 554, 559–60.
27. Id. at 575–78.
28. Id. at 575.
29. 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion).
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30

on capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles under 18.” This
31
chastening statement is laudable, but thus far has not succeeded in moving the
government to become a party to that treaty.
Justice Kennedy concluded:
It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large
part on the understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of
young people may often be a factor in the crime. The opinion of the
world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide
32
respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.
33

Justices O’Connor and Scalia filed dissenting opinions. Justice Scalia
devoted an entire section of his opinion, Part III, to the majority’s use of, what he
called, “the views of other countries and the so-called international
34
community.” He charged that while the majority examined the record of
application of the juvenile death penalty in the twenty U.S. states that permit it,
“the Court is quite willing to believe that every foreign nation—of whatever
tyrannical political makeup and with however subservient or incompetent a court
35
system—in fact adheres to a rule of no death penalty for offenders under 18.”
Then Justice Scalia contended that “the basic premise of the Court’s argument—
that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—ought to
36
be rejected out of hand.” This was not, of course, a premise of the Court’s
37
reasoning. It is rather a straw man that Justice Scalia set up so he can easily
38
knock it down.
Justice Scalia concluded his discussion of foreign law with an attack on the
final paragraph of Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court, which reads: “It does
not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to
acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other
nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within
39
our own heritage of freedom.”

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
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Roper, 542 U.S. at 576.
See id.
Id. at 578 (citation omitted).
Id. at 587 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 622–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 623.
Id. at 624.
See id. at 575–78.
See id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 628 (quoting id. at 578).
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Justice Scalia, obviously unsettled by this eloquent explanation, fired back:
The Court’s parting attempt to downplay the significance of its extensive
discussion of foreign law is unconvincing. “Acknowledgment” of foreign
approval has no place in the legal opinion of this Court unless it is part of
the basis for the Court’s judgment—which is surely what it parades as
40
today.
Justice Scalia disdains the idea that the United States should conform with
the rest of the world. This might be a defensible doctrine if it dealt with economic
or other matters not fitting within the field of international human-rights law. But
the United States, whether Justice Scalia likes it or not, is bound by international
law, including the branch of international law dealing with human rights. If we
are an outlier in this area, the clear implication is that we are in breach of relevant
treaties or, if the United States is not a party to those treaties, customary
international law. If this is what Justice Scalia wishes for us, it is something that
runs entirely counter to the tenets of the Framers of our Constitution that Justice
41
Scalia holds so dear.
42
Justice O’Connor also dissented from the Court’s judgment. On the use of
43
what she called “foreign and international law,” Justice O’Connor had the
following to say:
Without question, there has been a global trend in recent years toward
abolishing capital punishment for under-18 offenders. Very few, if any,
countries other than the United States now permit this practice in law or
in fact. While acknowledging that the actions and views of other
countries do not dictate the outcome of our Eighth Amendment inquiry,
the Court asserts that “the overwhelming weight of international opinion
against the juvenile death penalty . . . does provide respected and
significant confirmation for [its] own conclusions.” Because I do not
believe that a genuine national consensus against the juvenile death
penalty has yet developed, and because I do not believe the Court’s
moral proportionality argument justifies a categorical, age-based
constitutional rule, I can assign no such confirmatory role to the
international consensus described by the Court. . . .
Nevertheless, I disagree with JUSTICE SCALIA’s contention . . . that
foreign and international law have no place in our Eighth Amendment

40. Id.
41. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text (providing early instances of the Court’s respect for
international law).
42. Id. at 587–607 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 604.
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jurisprudence. Over the course of nearly half a century, the Court has
consistently referred to foreign and international law as relevant to its
assessment of evolving standards of decency. This inquiry reflects the
special character of the Eighth Amendment, which, as the Court has long
held, draws its meaning directly from the maturing values of civilized
44
society.
These passages are interesting for several reasons. First, Justice O’Connor
does not take issue with Justice Kennedy’s use of international authority to
45
confirm conclusions the Court has arrived at independently. Second, Justice
O’Connor seems to go even further than Justice Kennedy, suggesting that
“foreign and international law is relevant to [the Court’s] assessment of evolving
46
standards of decency” —that is, that such sources are relevant to the initial
assessment, not just as confirmation of a conclusion at which the Court has
already arrived. Finally, one cannot help but see in these lines a reflection of the
close intellectual relationship Justices O’Connor and Kennedy had forged over
the years and, in contrast, the rather antagonistic one that Justice Scalia had
47
precipitated with Justice O’Connor.
The final case I would like to touch upon is Graham v. Florida, a 2010
48
decision of the Court. Graham involved the question of whether imposing a
sentence of life without the possibility of parole on a juvenile offender violates
49
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Graham
50
was sixteen when he committed armed burglary and another crime. After he
violated the terms of his probation by committing other crimes, he was sentenced
51
to life in prison. Florida had abolished its parole system, leaving executive
52
clemency as Graham’s only possibility for release.
The Court held that imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole on a juvenile offender violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of
53
cruel and unusual punishment. In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court
again found support for its conclusion in the practices of other nations and the

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 604–05 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
See id.
Id. at 604 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., David M. O’Brien, High-Court Power Play: Thomas, Scalia vs. O’Connor, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (Mar. 15, 1992), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1992-03-15/news/9203130247_1_scalia-joinedjustice-antonin-scalia-thomas (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Tensions between Scalia and
O’Connor went public in the 1989 decision Webster vs. Reproductive Health Services.”).
48. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
49. Id. at 2017–18.
50. Id. at 2018–20.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2020.
53. Id. at 2034.
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international community. Justice Kennedy observed that the United States, “in
continuing to impose life without parole sentences on juveniles who did not
55
commit homicide, . . . adheres to a sentencing practice rejected the world over.”
He then wrote that while “[t]his observation does not control our decision[ and
t]he judgments of other nations and the international community are not
56
dispositive as to the meaning of the Eighth Amendment,” “[t]he climate of
international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular punishment is
57
also not irrelevant.”
The amici of the State of Florida had argued “that no international legal
agreement that is binding on the United States prohibits life without parole for
58
juvenile offenders and [urged the Court] to ignore the international consensus.”
Justice Kennedy’s response was firm:
These arguments miss the mark. The question before us is not whether
international law prohibits the United States from imposing the sentence
at issue in this case. The question is whether that punishment is cruel and
unusual. In that inquiry, “the overwhelming weight of international
opinion against” life without parole for nonhomicide offenses committed
by juveniles “provide[s] respected and significant confirmation for our
59
own conclusions.”
Justice Kennedy further explained:
The Court has treated the laws and practices of other nations and
international agreements as relevant to the Eighth Amendment not
because those norms are binding or controlling but because the judgment
of the world’s nations that a particular sentencing practice is inconsistent
with basic principles of decency demonstrates that the Court’s rationale
60
has respected reasoning to support it.
Rather remarkably, there was no dissent from this section of the opinion.
The foregoing opinions of Justice Kennedy show that he has continued a
longstanding practice of the Court of referring to international materials in
61
decisions on matters of fundamental constitutional moment. These opinions,
when read together, raise the tantalizing question of whether Justice Kennedy
may be laying the groundwork for a larger role for international materials in
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 2033–34.
Id. at 2033.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 2034 (citing the Solidarity Center for Law and Justice).
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)).
Id.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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future cases—one that would use such materials not only to support or confirm a
constitutional interpretation on which the Court had already decided, but would
play a role in the determination of the proper interpretation itself.
III. CONCLUSION
It is interesting to speculate on what motivates Justice Kennedy to give a
special place to international sources in some of his opinions. It is not improbable
that one factor that is at least partly responsible for Justice Kennedy’s awareness
of the way in which other countries and systems handle some of the difficult
issues that come before the Supreme Court is his having taught for nearly a
quarter of a century in University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law’s
62
summer program at the University of Salzburg in Austria. Justice Kennedy
taught a course in this program called Fundamental Rights, with Professor
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, now of Oxford University. Professor Douglas-Scott
focused on the European human rights system while Justice Kennedy examined
some of the difficult issues the United States Supreme Court has had to deal with
in the context of our Bill of Rights. Thus, this amounted to a course in
comparative human rights law. I suspect that just as the fortunate students
learned much from these two professors, the professors learned from each other,
as well. It does not seem far-fetched to imagine that regular exposure to
developments in Europe’s advanced human rights system may have strengthened
Justice Kennedy’s resolve to draw upon that experience in appropriate cases and
to defend doing so against assaults from some of his colleagues on the Court.
But whatever his motivation for referring to international sources, I believe
Justice Kennedy’s opinions are richer and more compelling for this practice, and
that the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is strengthened significantly by it.
For these reasons, it is to be hoped that Justice Kennedy will continue to take
international materials into account as appropriate in future opinions.

62. For more information about the summer program, see UNIVERSITY OF THE PACIFIC, MCGEORGE
SCHOOL OF LAW, SUMMER IN SALZBURG, AUSTRIA, http://mcgeorge.edu/Future_Students/JD_Program/
Global_Impact/Study_Abroad/Summer_in_Salzburg.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
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